Evolutionary dynamics for the firm's organizational mode based on the theory of learning in games

被引：0
作者：
Shi, Kui-Ran [1 ,2 ]
Sheng, Zhao-Han [2 ]
Xiao, Tiao-Jun [2 ]
机构：
[1] College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Technology
[2] School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2007年 / 27卷 / 06期
关键词：
Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionary equilibrium; Organizational mode; Spillover effect;
D O I：
10.1016/s1874-8651(08)60037-x
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The evolutionary dynamics for the firm's organizational mode are studied by the theory of learning in games. The firms are assumed to be bounded rationality and myopia, and they choose the organizational mode in terms of their own preferences and the market share of the organizational mode. The evolutionary dynamics and the adaptive learning algorithm are presented by considering entry of the firm. It is demonstrated that the profit function greatly impact on the evolutionary equilibria. Based on the internal and the external spillover effect of two populations, the corresponding evolutionary dynamics is developed to study the evolutionary equilibria and basins of attraction of equilibria. Theoretical analysis and numerical examples show that the evolutionary equilibria for the firm's organizational mode depend on the spillover effect from the perspective of long run.
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页码：64 / 70
页数：6
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