Complexity of airlines' dynamic price competition with delayed decision

被引：0
作者：
Hu, Rong [1 ]
Li, Tianrui [1 ]
Zhang, Jun [1 ]
Jiang, Chao [1 ]
机构：
[1] College of Civil Aviation, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing
来源：
Complex Systems and Complexity Science | 2015年 / 12卷 / 01期
关键词：
Airlines; Complexity; Delayed decision; Price competition; Theory of bifurcation;
D O I：
10.13306/j.1672-3813.2015.01.007
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
To investigate the influence of delayed decision and bounded rationality on complexity of airlines' price competition, the airlines' dynamic price competition model based on delayed bounded rationality was established by using the theory of bifurcation of dynamic systems. Theoretic analysis and numerical simulations were provided to study the complex dynamics of this model. The results show that the larger weight of delayed decision can enlarge the stability region of the model and shorten the time of the model to reach the equilibrium points. When the model is unstable, it is more beneficial for airlines to use delayed decision. And once an airline uses delayed decision, the free-rider problem can be shown from the competitors who will get extra profits. It is important to choose a reasonable weight of delayed decision to balance airlines' market performance. ©, 2015, The Journal Agency of Complex Systems and Complexity Science. All right reserved.
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页码：46 / 52
页数：6
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