Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Model and Mechanism Design Under the Consideration of the Risk Attitude

被引：0
|
作者：
Chen D.-Y. [1 ,2 ]
Wang D.-W. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Information Science & Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang
[2] College of Science, Liaoning Shihua University, Fushun
来源：
Dongbei Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Northeastern University | 2019年 / 40卷 / 12期
关键词：
Auction mechanism; Comprehensive efficiency; Multi-attribute reverse auction; Risk attitude; Winner decision;
D O I：
10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2019.12.003
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
To solve the difficulty of identifying score function and attribute weight, a winner decision model including the fuzzy input-output efficiency and supplier capability was proposed, as well as a two-stage auction mechanism. The effective bidding information could be extracted and the inferior sellers could be eliminated by the buyer in the first stage of the auction. In the second stage, the bidding value of attributes could be optimized and the final winner could be determined. The result of numerical example verified the validity of the model. The two-stage auction mechanism ensures the interests of buyer without the information disclosure. With the increase of buyers' risk preference, the comprehensive efficiency score of sellers increases. Different risk attitudes will lead to the change of auction strategies of both parties and the difference of auction result. © 2019, Editorial Department of Journal of Northeastern University. All right reserved.
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页码：1685 / 1689
页数：4
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