Hybrid recycling modes for closed-loop supply chain under premium and penalty mechanism

被引：0
|
作者：
Yi, Yu-Yin [1 ]
Liang, Jia-Mi [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Management, Jinan University
来源：
Jisuanji Jicheng Zhizao Xitong/Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, CIMS | 2014年 / 20卷 / 01期
关键词：
Closed-loop supply chain; Game theory; Hybrid recycling; Premium and penalty mechanism;
D O I：
10.13196/j.cims.2014.01.yiyuyin.0215.9.20140127
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
To research the influence of government premium and penalty mechanism on optimal pricing and channel selection of closed-loop supply chain node enterprises, three hybrid recycling models of product remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain were constructed by using game theory under the premium and penalty mechanism. In different hybrid recycling modes, the profits of return rate, retail price, node enterprises and supply chain were compared and analyzed, and the selection problem of optimal hybrid recycling mode was researched from aspects of environment, customer, node enterprises and supply chain. By using numerical analysis method, the proposed method was verified, and the impact of the premium and penalty on decisions and profit of enterprises was analyzed.
引用
收藏
页码：215 / 223
页数：8
相关论文
共 14 条
  • [1] Webster S., Mitra S., Competitive strategy in remanufacturing and the impact of take-back laws, Journal of Operations Management, 25, 6, pp. 1123-1140, (2007)
  • [2] Mitra S., Webster S., Competition in remanufacturing and the effects of government subsidies, International Journal of Production Economics, 111, 2, pp. 287-298, (2008)
  • [3] Wang Y., Sun L., Li G., Et al., Shareing take-back responsibility across closed-loop supply chain, Journal of Systems & Management, 18, 4, pp. 378-384, (2009)
  • [4] Wang W., Da Q., The comparison of premium, penalty and premium and penalty mechanism for remanufacturing reverse supply chain coordination, Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 24, 4, pp. 48-52, (2010)
  • [5] Wang W., Da Q., Sun H., Design of the premium mechanism and the premium and penalty mechanism for the remanufacturing reverse supply chain coordination, Chinese Journal of Management Science, 17, 5, pp. 46-52, (2009)
  • [6] Wang W., Da Q., Study on premium and penalty mechanisms for the electronic product reverse supply chain considering the leading of government, Chinese Journal of Management Science, 18, 2, pp. 62-67, (2010)
  • [7] Nie J., Wang W., Wu Q., The effects of premium and penalty mechanism on manufacturer take-back closed-loop supply chain, Industrial Engineering and Management, 16, 2, pp. 52-59, (2011)
  • [8] Savaskan R.C., Bhattacharya S., Van Wassenhove L.N., Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing, Management Science, 50, 2, pp. 239-252, (2004)
  • [9] Xiong Z., Huang D., Xiong Y., On the closed-loop supply chain modes of product remanufacturing with government reimbursement, Industrial Engineering Journal, 14, 2, pp. 1-5, (2011)
  • [10] Zhang L., Pan X., Wang Z., Et al., A study on different take-back modes for end-of-life vehicle reverse logistics, Automotive Engineering, 33, 9, pp. 823-827, (2011)
12