Research on enterprise compensation system based on dynamic basis compensation

被引：0
作者：
Zheng S. [1 ,2 ]
Cui X. [1 ,2 ]
Wang S. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Shang W. [1 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing
[2] School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing
[3] Center for Forecasting Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2022年 / 42卷 / 04期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Compensation system; Dynamic basis compensation; Incentive mechanism; Performance-related compensation; Principalagent model;
D O I：
10.12011/SETP2020-0312
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper proposes a multi-stage dynamic basis compensation model based on the principal-agent model, in order to solve the two major problems existing in the enterprise compensation system of our country. The first problem is that the fixed basis compensation is not incentive to the employee, and the second one is that the compensation incentive mechanism is limited because of the unbalanced compensation structure. We compare the dynamic basis compensation model with the traditional fixed basis compensation model, and find that the dynamic basis compensation model has the superiority of improving employee's effort level, as well as the compensation structure. At the same time, we study the applicability of the dynamic basis compensation model in depth and prove that under certain conditions, the dynamic basis compensation model is a Pareto improvement to the traditional fixed basis compensation model. Our research provides a reference for the design and improvement of the enterprise compensation system of our country. © 2022, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
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页码：958 / 966
页数：8
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