Secure Distributed Control for Demand Response in Power Systems Against Deception Cyber-Attacks With Arbitrary Patterns

被引:26
作者
Yang, Shaohua [1 ,2 ]
Lao, Keng-Weng [1 ,2 ]
Hui, Hongxun [1 ,2 ]
Chen, Yulin [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Macau, State Key Lab Internet Things Smart City, Macau 999078, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Macau, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Macau 999078, Peoples R China
[3] Zhejiang Univ, Hainan Inst, Sanya 572025, Peoples R China
关键词
HVAC; Decentralized control; Power systems; Cyberattack; Heating systems; Power system stability; Regulation; Demand response; deception cyber-attack; arbitrary attack pattern; secure distributed control; Lyapunov theorem; CONTROL STRATEGY;
D O I
10.1109/TPWRS.2024.3381231
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Demand response (DR) is a crucial component of power systems that can offer operating reserves by utilizing flexible loads on the demand side. With the development of communication, information, and control technologies, DR has formed a cyber-physical system. While deep cyber-physical coupling improves the performance of DR, it also introduces cyber-security threats, i.e., deception cyber-attacks (DCAs), which can lead to DR out-of-control and thus threaten the power system's safe operation. To this end, this paper proposes a secure distributed control to safeguard DR against DCAs. First, a cyber-physical DR community is developed based on a distributed control framework for offering operating reserve to power systems. In addition, considering different patterns, the impacts of DCAs on DR are quantified, revealing that different attack patterns can lead to various adverse consequences on DR, such as power deviation, delayed response, power fluctuation, etc. Furthermore, an anti-attack secure distributed control is developed for DR to counteract against arbitrary DCAs. In addition, rigorous proof based on Lyapunov theorem demonstrates that the proposed control can ensure the stability and convergence for the DR power regulation required by power systems, despite arbitrary DCAs. Finally, case studies validate the efficacy of the proposed control method.
引用
收藏
页码:7277 / 7290
页数:14
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