Two-Layer Deception Model Based on Signaling Games Against Cyber Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems

被引:0
作者
Kamdem, Priva Chassem [1 ]
Zemkoho, Alain B. [2 ]
Njilla, Laurent [3 ]
Nkenlifack, Marcellin [1 ]
Kamhoua, Charles A. [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Dschang, Dept Math & Comp Sci, Dschang, Cameroon
[2] Univ Southampton, Sch Math Sci, Southampton SO17 1BJ, England
[3] Air Force Res Lab, Informat Assurance Branch, Rome, NY 13441 USA
[4] DEVCOM Army Res Lab, Charles Kamhoua Network Secur Branch, Adelphi, MD 20783 USA
关键词
Games; Cyber-physical systems; Bayes methods; Physical layer; Hardware; Cyberattack; Uncertainty; Government; Adaptation models; Vehicle dynamics; cyberattacks; deception-based techniques; defender's action space; signaling games; perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium;
D O I
10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3478808
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated cyber-attacks that can target multiple layers within the system. To strengthen defenses against these complex threats, deception-based techniques have emerged as a promising solution. While previous research has primarily focused on single-layer deception strategies, the authors argue that a multi-layer approach is essential for effectively countering advanced attackers capable of perceiving information across both the application and network layers. In this work, we propose a two-layer deception model based on signaling games to enhance the defense of CPS. Our model captures the dynamic, non-cooperative interactions between the attacker and defender under conditions of incomplete information. Unlike existing approaches, our model expands the defender's action space to incorporate deception at both the application and network layers, while maintaining the attacker's uncertainty about the true system type. Through analytical and simulation results, we identify the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) strategies for both players. Our findings demonstrate that the two-layer deception model significantly outperforms single-layer deception in deceiving the attacker and improving system resilience, particularly against sophisticated adversaries capable of perceiving information across multiple layers.
引用
收藏
页码:171559 / 171570
页数:12
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