Research on the price regulation strategy of online car-hailing considering different regulation targets

被引：0
作者：
Zhao D. [1 ]
Yang J. [1 ]
机构：
[1] College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin
来源：
Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2019年 / 39卷 / 10期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Online car-hailing service; Price regulation; Regulation target; Sharing economy; Taxi service;
D O I：
10.12011/1000-6788-2018-0406-12
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In view of the ride service market in which online car-hailing service and taxi service coexist, this paper studies the price regulation strategy to ensure the coexistence of the online car-hailing service and the taxi service, considering high-end or low-end online car-hailing service based on different perceived service experience of the online car-hailing service. The regulation targets are Participation (Target 1) and Fairness (Target 2), respectively. This paper compares the price regulation mechanism with these two targets. The results show that when the platform provides the high-end service, and taxi service price is at a high level or a low level, it needs to increase the price of online car-hailing service; otherwise, the target 1 can be achieved without regulation. However, it needs to raise the price of online car-hailing service to realize target 2 under the condition of a lower taxi price. When the platform provides the low-end service, the optimal price of the online car-hailing service is related to the perceived service level of the two services and the taxi service price. Regardless of the high-end or low-end service provided by the platform, the regulation intensity of regulation target 1 is higher than that of regulation target 2. © 2019, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
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收藏
页码：2523 / 2534
页数：11
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