Probabilistic memory-one strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

被引：0
作者：
Delahaye J.-P. [1 ]
Mathieu P. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ. Lille, CNRS, Centrale Lille, UMR 9189, CRIStAL (équipe SMAC, Centre de Recherche en Informatique Signal et Automatique de Lille, Lille
来源：
| 2018年 / Lavoisier卷 / 32期
关键词：
Behaviour; Game theory; Iterated prisoner's dilemma; Mixted strategies;
D O I：
10.3166/RIA.32.141-167
中图分类号：
O211 [概率论（几率论、或然率论）];
学科分类号：
摘要：
We conduct a thorough experimental study of probabilistic strategies to the prisoner's dilemma. To do this, we use the complete class method associated with an evolutionary approach. The results we obtain are therefore objective in nature and depend as little as possible on the sets of strategies put in competition. The studied sets are large (several thousand strategies), homogeneous, and systematic. We test the robustness of our results by various methods. The best strategies identified are for some of them new in the sense that they have never been clearly identified by previous studies, despite their simplicity. We propose a criterion that leads to a good anticipation of their behavior in various contexts. We compare the results of this study with those obtained by the mathematical approaches of Press and Dyson. We also confront the new strategies with the best known strategies. © 2018 Lavoisier.
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页码：141 / 167
页数：26
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