Managerial equity incentive, corporate risk-taking, and corporate performance

被引：0

作者：

Zeng, Jiang-Hong ^{[1
]}

Tan, Lin-Ping ^{[1
]}

Chen, Xiao-Hong ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] School of Business, Central South University, No. 932, Lushan South Road, Changsha

来源：

International Journal of Simulation and Process Modelling | 2014年 / 9卷 / 04期

关键词：

Corporate risk-taking; Executive stock options; Firm value; Managerial equity incentive;

D O I：

10.1504/IJSPM.2014.066370

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Based on data from the equity incentive plans of Chinese firms listed on the stock market between 2006 and 2011, this study empirically investigates the relationship between managerial equity incentive, corporate risk-taking, and corporate performance. The paper first uses the volatility of corporate earnings in order to measure the degree of corporate risk-taking, and the findings suggest that there is a significantly positive association between managerial equity incentive and corporate risk-taking. Moreover, compared to lower level staff, the risktaking effect on managers is stronger. Additionally, the degree of corporate risk-taking of sample in China is low. Therefore an increase in the level of corporate risk-taking can considerably increase the firm's value. This paper also uses the volatility of stock returns as a proxy variable of the degree of corporate risk-taking, and the findings do not change substantially. Copyright © 2014 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

引用

页码：246 / 254

页数：8

共 28 条

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