Government’s control countermeasures against environmental pollution by introducing third-party constraints

被引:0
作者
Zhao Y. [1 ]
机构
[1] School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan
关键词
Environmental pollution; Game analysis; Government governance; Third-party constraints;
D O I
10.46488/NEPT.2020.V19I02.012
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
With the rapid development of China’s economy, environmental pollution becomes increasingly serious in recent years. The environmental governance model of “who pollutes, who governs” is that polluters handle pollutants following relevant laws and regulations under government supervision. Practice shows that this governance model has little effect. The pressure of social groups plays an important role in promoting compliance with laws and regulations and reducing corporate emissions. To improve the government’s control of environmental pollution, third-party organizations as binding parties, mainly referring to the public, civil organizations, and the news media were introduced; a game model with government, sewage companies, and third-party organizations as participants was built. The results show that countermeasures against government environmental pollution are constrained third parties and effectively restrict the environmental pollution behaviour of sewage companies. This scenario alleviates the problem of information asymmetry between government and enterprises, reduces the cost of government supervision, and helps strengthen the governance of environmental pollution issues. © 2020 Technoscience Publications. All rights reserved.
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页码:571 / 576
页数:5
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