Cost-profit sharing contract for a closed-loop supply chain under reward-penalty mechanism

被引：0

作者：

Wang W.-B. ^{[1
]}

Ding J.-F. ^{[1
]}

Da Q.-L. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou

[2] School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing

来源：

Kongzhi yu Juece/Control and Decision | 2019年 / 34卷 / 04期

关键词：

Closed-loop supply chain; Collection rate; Coordination; Cost-profit sharing contract; Decision; Reward-penalty mechanism;

D O I：

10.13195/j.kzyjc.2017.1293

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper investigates the cost-profit sharing contract for a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) under the reward-penalty mechanism (RPM), and then respectively develops the centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain decision models under penalty mechanism with and without the cost-profit sharing contract. The results show that, with the increase of the reward-penalty intensity, the retail price of product decreases; all the buy-back price, the collection rate and the collector's profit increase, while the manufacturer's profit relates to the target collection rate; with the increase of the cost-sharing ratio and the profit-sharing ratio, the retail price increases, which is always lower than that without the contract, and the collection rate decreases, but is always higher than that without the contract; the buy-back price increases as the cost-sharing ratio increases, while decreases as the profit-sharing ratio increases. The manufacturer can always benefit from the cost-profit sharing contract, but the collector will not accept the contract unless the cost-sharing ratio is mild and the profit-sharing ratio is large. This also indicates that the cost-profit sharing contract takes effect and can coordinate the CLSC in this condition. © 2019, Editorial Office of Control and Decision. All right reserved.

引用

页码：843 / 850

页数：7

共 21 条

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