Hardware countermeasure against side-channel attacks based on randomized instruction injection

被引：0

作者：

He, Zhangqing ^{[1
,2
]}

Ao, Tianyong ^{[1
,3
]}

Liu, Kai ^{[1
]}

Dai, Kui ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] School of Optical and Electronic Information, Huazhong University of Science and Technology

[2] School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Hubei University of Technology

[3] School of Physics and Electronics, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004, Henan

来源：

Huazhong Keji Daxue Xuebao (Ziran Kexue Ban)/Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology (Natural Science Edition) | 2014年 / 42卷 / 05期

关键词：

Configuration register; Countermeasures; Random delays; Randomized instruction injection; Side channel attacks;

D O I：

10.13245/j.hust.140526

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

A randomized instruction injection technique was proposed, and the instruction injection hardware module which could generate random instructions and insert them into the normal instruction streams at any time was integrated into CPU (central processing unit). The power profile of a cryptographic application will be confused by the module, leading to power analysis attacks becoming very hardly and even impossible. The shadow registers and other strategies were used to resolve the conflict between the execution of normal instructions and random instructions. A configuration register was used to control the operating modes and reduce the overhead of randomized instruction injection. Experimental results show that the countermeasure proposed has stronger security and lower cost than that of current techniques.

引用

页码：128 / 132

页数：4

共 13 条

[11]

Brier E., Clavier C., Olivier F., Correlation power analysis with a leak age model, Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems 2004, pp. 16-29, (2004)

[12]

Gierlichs B., Batina L., Tuyls P., Et al., Mutual information analysis-a gen eric side-channel distinguisher, Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems 2008, pp. 426-442, (2008)

[13]

Chari S., Rao J.R., Rohatgi P., Et al., Template attacks, Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems 2003, pp. 13-28, (2003)

← 1 2 →