“Ooh Aah… Just a little bit”: A small amount of side channel can go a longway

被引：106

作者：

Benger, Naomi ^{[1
]}

van de Pol, Joop ^{[2
]}

Smart, Nigel P. ^{[2
]}

Yarom, Yuval ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] School of Computer Science, The University of Adelaide

[2] Dept. Computer Science, University of Bristol

来源：

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) | 2014年 / 8731卷

基金：

英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;

关键词：

41;

D O I：

10.1007/978-3-662-44709-3_5

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We apply the FLUSH+RELOAD side-channel attack based on cache hits/misses to extract a small amount of data from OpenSSL ECDSA signature requests. We then apply a “standard” lattice technique to extract the private key, but unlike previous attacks we are able to make use of the side-channel information from almost all of the observed executions. This means we obtain private key recovery by observing a relatively small number of executions, and by expending a relatively small amount of post-processing via lattice reduction. We demonstrate our analysis via experiments using the curve secp256k1 used in the Bitcoin protocol. In particular we show that with as little as 200 signatures we are able to achieve a reasonable level of success in recovering the secret key for a 256-bit curve. This is significantly better than prior methods of applying lattice reduction techniques to similar side channel information © International Association for Cryptologic Research 2014.

引用

页码：75 / 92

页数：17

共 40 条

[31] Page D., Theoretical use of cache memory as a cryptanalytic side-channel, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2002, (2000)
[32] Percival C.
[33] Ron D., Shamir A., Quantitative analysis of the full Bitcoin transaction graph
[34] Schnorr C.-P., Euchner M., Lattice basis reduction: Improved practical algorithms and solving subset sum problems, FCT 1991.LNCS, 529, pp. 68-85, (1991)
[35] Stinson D.R., Some baby-step giant-step algorithms for the low Hamming weight discrete logarithm problem, Math. Comput, 71, 237, pp. 379-391, (2002)
[36] Tromer E., Osvik D.A., Shamir A., Efficient cache attacks in AES, and countermeasures, Journal of Cryptology, 23, 2, pp. 37-71, (2010)
[37] Waldspurger C.A., Memory resource management in VMware ESX Server, Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, pp. 181-194, (2002)
[38] Yarom Y., Benger N., Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA nonces using the Flush+Reload cache side-channel attack. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/140, (2014)
[39] Yarom Y., Falkner K., FLUSH+RELOAD: A high resolution, low noise, L3 cache sidechannel attack, Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security Symposium (to appear, (2014)
[40] Zhang Y., Jules A., Reiter M.K., Ristenpart T., Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys, Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security, Raleigh, pp. 305-316, (2012)

← 1 2 3 4 →