Transaction prices of overseas mergers and acquisitions with a redemption provision

被引：0

作者：

Long D. ^{[1
,3
]}

Huang H. ^{[2
]}

Wang M. ^{[2
]}

Yang Y. ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] School of Economics and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing

[2] Department of Industrial Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing

[3] Headquarters in Beijing, Chengzhi Shareholding Corporation, Ltd., Beijing

来源：

Yang, Yongsen (yangyongsen@thcz.com.cn) | 1600年 / Tsinghua University卷 / 56期

关键词：

Asset pricing; Bargaining; Overseas merger and acquisition; Redemption provision; Transaction price;

D O I：

10.16511/j.cnki.qhdxxb.2016.25.025

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Chinese enterprises are competing in the global business through overseas mergers and acquisitions. This paper studies a mechanism for asset pricing and transaction price formation which includes fundamental concerns and key phases related to redemption provisions. The process assesses the target enterprise value by the real option method, determines the transaction price interval, computes the nominal values via the utility maximization or bargaining models, and updates the asset purchasing price for the transaction with repurchase clauses. The present value and utility equivalency strategies are used to predict the transaction price formation. The effect of the redemption provision is described by a probability which is related to the transaction price. A case study shows the feasibility of this method for evaluating overseas mergers and acquisitions for an A-share company purchasing an overseas bioenergy life science company with the redemption provision. This is a comprehensive, integrated approach for evaluating the value of a firm and determining the purchase price through the bargaining between the buyer and the seller. © 2016, Tsinghua University Press. All right reserved.

引用

页码：851 / 859

页数：8

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