Bidding asymmetries in multi-unit auctions: Implications of bid function equilibria in the British spot market for electricity

被引：27

作者：

Crawford, Gregory S. ^{[1
]}

Crespo, Joseph ^{[2
]}

Tauchen, Helen ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, University of Arizona

[2] Wood Mackenzie, Inc., Boston, MA

[3] Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

来源：

International Journal of Industrial Organization | 2007年 / 25卷 / 06期

关键词：

Asymmetry; Bid function equilibrium; Electricity; England and Wales; Multi-unit auctions;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.001

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper introduces and tests Bid Function Equilibria (BFE) in the British spot market for electricity. BFE extend von der Fehr and Harbord's (1993) multi-unit auction model of wholesale electricity markets by allowing firms to have heterogeneous costs for different generating units. Pure-strategy equilibria in BFE predict asymmetric bidding by producers: a single firm (the price-setter") bids strategically while other firms ("non-price-setters") bid their costs. We test for asymmetries in firms' bid functions in the British spot market between 1993 and 1995 and find strong empirical support for the theory. We conclude that BFE have important implications for the design and governance of electricity markets. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved."

引用

页码：1233 / 1268

页数：35

共 37 条

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