Quantitative analysis of sliding window attack for the RSA timing channel

被引:1
作者
Mao B. [1 ]
Mu D. [1 ]
Hu W. [1 ,2 ]
Zhang H. [1 ]
Tai Y. [1 ]
Zhang L. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical Univ., Xi'an
[2] University of California, San Diego, San Diego
来源
| 1600年 / Science Press卷 / 44期
关键词
Information leakage; Information theory; Quantitative analysis; Side channel attack; Timing attack;
D O I
10.3969/j.issn.1001-2400.2017.05.020
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The timing channel residing in RSA hardware implementations imposes a major threat to hardware security. In this work, we propose a sliding window timing attack method with significant improvement in the attack success rate and employ an information theoretic model to quantitatively measure the effectiveness of the proposed attack. Experimental results show that the sliding window attack method increases the attack success rate from 73% to 96% as compared to Kocher's timing attack, which uses a single bit window. Our results also reveal a strong correlation between attack success rates and the mutual information measurements of the key and encryption time. This indicates that information theoretic metrics can serve as an approach for quantifying the effectiveness of the sliding window timing attack method and evaluating timing channel threat of the RSA hardware architecture. © 2017, The Editorial Board of Journal of Xidian University. All right reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:114 / 120
页数:6
相关论文
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