Strategyproof matching with minimum quotas

被引：47

作者：

Fragiadakis, Daniel ^{[1
]}

Iwasaki, Atsushi ^{[2
]}

Troyan, Peter ^{[3
]}

Ueda, Suguru ^{[4
]}

Yokoo, Makoto ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Texas A and M University, 4228 TAMU, College Station,TX,77843, United States

[2] Graduate School of Information Systems, University of Electro-Communications, 1-5-1 Chofugaoka, Chofu, Tokyo,182-8585, Japan

[3] Department of Economics, University of Virginia, PO Box 400182, Charlottesville,VA,22904, United States

[4] Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University, 744 Motooka, Nishi-ku, Fukuoka,819-0395, Japan

来源：

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation | 2015年 / 4卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1145/2841226

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas. Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching, military cadet matching, and school choice, but current mechanisms are unable to accommodate them, leading to the use of ad hoc solutions. We introduce two new classes of strategyproof mechanisms that allow for minimum quotas as an explicit input and show that our mechanisms improve welfare relative to existing approaches. Because minimum quotas cause a theoretical incompatibility between standard fairness and nonwastefulness properties, we introduce new second-best axioms and show that they are satisfied by our mechanisms. Last, we use simulations to quantify (1) the magnitude of the potential efficiency gains from our mechanisms and (2) how far the resulting assignments are from the first-best definitions of fairness and nonwastefulness. Combining both the theoretical and simulation results, we argue that our mechanisms will improve the performance of matching markets with minimum quota constraints in practice. Copyright © 2015 ACM.

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