Strategy of asymmetric duopolist sending targeted advertising based on consumer's preference

被引：0

作者：

Zhao J. ^{[1
,2
]}

Mei S. ^{[2
]}

Zhong W. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] School of Business Administration, Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics, Hangzhou

[2] School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing

来源：

Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2017年 / 37卷 / 02期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Competitive market; Price discrimination; Strong market; Targeted advertising; Targeting precision;

D O I：

10.12011/1000-6788(2017)02-0389-10

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

To explore the effects of consumer's preference on product pricing and targeted advertising, the mathematical model with asymmetric duopolist using targeted advertising and price discrimination on firm's profit is established, and related case study is performed. The results indicate that consumer's preference directly affects the firm's profit. More targeted advertising are sent to the firm's strong market for higher benefits even the price discrimination is not allowed. However, when the price discrimination is permitted, both firms will send more ads in their strong market and provide a high price to the consumer. Otherwise, the strategy of price discrimination and targeted advertising can be used as the effective tool for firm's marketing strategy. When the firm has the imperfect targeting precision, the strategy of targeted advertising and price discrimination might intensify market competition. © 2017, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.

引用

页码：389 / 398

页数：9

共 21 条

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