On the Solution of Revenue- and Network-Constrained Day-Ahead Market Clearing Under Marginal Pricing-Part I: An Exact Bilevel Programming Approach

The first of this two-paper series addresses a practical day-ahead auction model, where generation revenue constraints are explicitly incorporated in the problem formulation, as routinely done in several national electricity markets across Europe. The revenue-constrained market-clearing procedure includes the effect of the transmission network, inter-temporal constraints associated with generation scheduling, demand-side bidding, and marginal pricing. This auction design is an instance of price-based market clearing which features two major complicating factors. First, locational marginal prices become decision variables of the optimization process. In addition, producer revenues are formulated as bilinear and highly nonconvex products of power outputs and market-clearing prices. The resulting problem is formulated as a mixed-integer nonlinear bilevel program with bilinear terms for which available solution techniques rely on heuristics, approximations, or modeling simplifications. This paper presents a novel and exact methodology whereby the original problem is recast as an equivalent single-level mixed-integer linear program. As a consequence, finite convergence to optimality is guaranteed and the use of standard commercial software is allowed. The proposed transformation is based on duality theory of linear programming, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, and integer algebra results. In the second part of this two-paper series, numerical results from several case studies illustrate the effective performance of the proposed solution approach.