Coordinated cyber-physical attacks of cyber-physical power system

被引：0

作者：

Yang Y. ^{[1
]}

Lan S. ^{[1
]}

Qin Z. ^{[1
]}

Liu H. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] School of Electrical Engineering, Guangxi University, Nanning

来源：

Dianli Zidonghua Shebei/Electric Power Automation Equipment | 2020年 / 40卷 / 02期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Coordinated cyber-physical attacks; Cyber-physical system; False data injection attack; Smart grid; State estimation;

D O I：

10.16081/j.epae.202001004

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

With the development of smart grid and the continuous introduction of smart devices into CPPS(Cyber-Physical Power System), CPPS is faced with a new attack mode, that is CCPAS(Coordinated Cyber-Physical AttackS). This kind of attack mode is not only hidden but also can cause chain failure, which is easy to cause large-scale power failure. Firstly, the basic forms of CPPS suffering CCPAS are described. CCPAS model considering state estimation constraint is constructed under the DC power flow model. Then, the mechanism of CCPAS is discussed, the maximum attack range after circumventing state estimation monitoring is analyzed from the attacker's point of view, and the vulnerable lines of CPPS are analyzed under CCPAS scenarios. Finally, taking IEEE 14- and 118-bus systems as the examples, the validity and appli-cability of the proposed model are verified through simulation and calculation, and the limitations of physical attack after considering the state estimation constraints are compared and analyzed. © 2020, Electric Power Automation Equipment Press. All right reserved.

引用

页码：97 / 102

页数：5

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