Optimal and robust mechanism design with interdependent values

被引：6
作者：
Roughgarden T. [1 ]
Talgam-Cohen I. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Stanford University, Computer Science Department, Stanford, 94305, CA
来源：
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation | 2016年 / 4卷 / 03期
关键词：
Correlated values; Interdependence; Myerson theory; Optimal auctions; Prior independence;
D O I：
10.1145/2910577
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We study interdependent value settings and extend several results from the well-studied independent private values model to these settings. For revenue-optimal mechanism design, we give conditions under which Myerson's virtual value-based mechanism remains optimal with interdependent values. One of these conditions is robustness of the truthfulness and individual rationality guarantees, in the sense that they are required to hold ex-post. We then consider an even more robust class of mechanisms called "prior independent" ("detail free"), and show that, by simply using one of the bidders to set a reserve price, it is possible to extract near-optimal revenue in an interdependent values setting. This shows that a considerable level of robustness is achievable for interdependent values in single-parameter environments. © 2016 ACM.
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页码：1 / 34
页数：33
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