Dynamic pricing and emission abatement with reference effect

被引：0

作者：

Lou G.-X. ^{[1
]}

Zhang Y.-M. ^{[1
]}

Wan N. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai

[2] School of Business, Shanghai Dianji University, Shanghai

来源：

Kongzhi yu Juece/Control and Decision | 2018年 / 33卷 / 09期

关键词：

Dynamic programming; Emission abatement; Pricing; Reference effects;

D O I：

10.13195/j.kzyjc.2017.0547

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Considering the consumer demand characteristic of reference effects, the optimal price and emission abatement of monopolist manufacturer faced with different combinations of the two reference effects are studied bases on dynamic programming. The study shows that the monopolist manufacturer should decrease its price and emission abatement in the presence of reference price effect and promote its price and emission abatement in the presence of reference emission abatement effect, compared to no reference effect. The instant profit of monopolist with reference effects would be lower than that with no refererence effects, which measn, either of the two reference effects in the long term would be detrimental to the long-term interest. It is suggested that the monopolist manufacturer in the face of both reference effects should set lower price compared no reference effect, based on the analysis of the scenario with both reference effects and the fact that consumers nowadays are lack of low carbon consciousness and focus mainly on the retailing price. © 2018, Editorial Office of Control and Decision. All right reserved.

引用

页码：1667 / 1676

页数：9

共 19 条

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