Research on the incentive contract based on bargaining games

被引：0

作者：

Li, Hua ^{[1
,2
]}

Li, En-Ji ^{[1
]}

Sun, Qiu-Bai ^{[1
]}

Wang, Hong-Bo ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] School of Business Administration, University of Science and Technology Liaoning, Anshan,114051, China

[2] Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing,100732, China

来源：

Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice | 2015年 / 35卷 / 09期

关键词：

Optimization;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Under the realistic condition of the agent market is incomplete competitive, this paper assumes the principal-agent two sides negotiate based on incentive contract attaches great importance to the bargaining process, in which the principal bids first, then the agent counter-offer. Based on the bargaining process, the paper established and solved indefinitely Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game, while the agent's opportunism pay is analyzed. Then a nonlinear balanced contract is provided which based on the Nash equilibrium and the breakdown point. In the balanced contract, the principal receive a fixed profit and the agent get the remaining portion, in this way, the agent' pay is related the business performance closely. The incentive contract based on bargaining games maximize the benefits of the principal while maximize the agent's benefits, so the contract is balanced and efficient, it also provides a more realistic and referable way to design incentive contract. ©, 2015, Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.

引用

页码：2280 / 2287