CER and coordination of new/remanufactured product in supply chain considering low-carbon and carbon tax preference under capacity constraints

被引：0

作者：

Zhu C. ^{[1
]}

Ma J. ^{[1
]}

Zhang J. ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, 210007,

[2] Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 100732,

来源：

Jisuanji Jicheng Zhizao Xitong/Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, CIMS | 2024年 / 30卷 / 02期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

capacity constraints; carbon tax; coordination mechanism; low carbon preference; remanufactured product;

D O I：

10.13196/j.cims.2021.0640

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

To study the influence of carbon tax, low-carbon preference and capacity constraint on carbon emissions, a two-echelon supply chain game model consisting of duopoly manufacturers and retailers was established. Stackelberg theory was used to analyze the effects of low-carbon preference and carbon tax on new/remanufactured product pricing and emission reduction decisions under capacity constraints under three different decentralized decisions. A new coordination mechanism was designed to improve the efficiency of supply chain. The results showed that under capacity constraints, the Carbon Emission Reduction(CER) behavior of manufacturers could be promoted effectively by both low-carbon preference and carbon tax policy, but the members' pricing strategies were also improved; manufacturers would always improve the carbon emission reduction of their products when the capacity increased, and the direction of price strategy adjustment was determined according to the emission reduction cost coefficient; the carbon emission reduction of products and the overall profit were better under the centralized decision, and the coordination of supply chain could be realized through the designed coordinate cost-profit sharing contract. © 2024 CIMS. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：717 / 729

页数：12

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