Impact of Buyers' Market Power on Innovation Incentives of Product Quality in Downstream Enterprises

被引：1

作者：

Guo X.-L. ^{[1
]}

Li K. ^{[1
]}

Nong B. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang

[2] Product Operations Department, China UnionPay, Shanghai

来源：

Dongbei Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Northeastern University | 2019年 / 40卷 / 08期

关键词：

Bertrand competition; Buyers' market power; Cooperation negotiation; Innovation incentive; Quality innovation;

D O I：

10.12068/j.issn.1005-3026.2019.08.024

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

A vertical product quality differentiation model consisting of monopolistic manufacturers and downstream oligarchic competitors was constructed. Based on this model, the changes in quality-innovating incentives and market equilibrium results were investigated before and after the downstream large-scale enterprises with high-quality products had market power. Research showed that when downstream enterprises at different quality levels all have no market power, the quality promotion of any party will stimulate the innovation enthusiasm of its competitors. When a downstream large-scale enterprise has market power and negotiates with an upstream manufacturer, the wholesale prices and the retail prices of the two downstream enterprises will decline with the increase of market power. At the same time, the wholesale prices, retail prices and market sales of the two downstream companies all depend on buyers' market power while the sales and profitability of small-scale enterprises remain unchanged. © 2019, Editorial Department of Journal of Northeastern University. All right reserved.

引用

页码：1197 / 1204

页数：7

共 12 条

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