Evolutionary game analysis of violation regulation in the electricity market based on blockchain technology

被引：2

作者：

Zhang Y. ^{[1
]}

Li S. ^{[2
]}

Li J. ^{[2
]}

Tang X. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing

[2] School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing

来源：

Journal of Intelligent and Fuzzy Systems | 2024年 / 46卷 / 04期

关键词：

Blockchain technology; electricity market; evolutionary game; violation regulation;

D O I：

10.3233/JIFS-238041

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Electricity market violations affect the overall operations of the electricity market. This paper explores the evolutionary stability strategies of electricity generation enterprises and electricity consumers under two modes: traditional regulation and blockchain regulation to analyze blockchain technology's mechanism and conditions in solving electricity market violations. The experimental results indicate that the likelihood of consumers accepting electricity and the regulatory capacity of regulatory agencies play a crucial role in determining the violation approach adopted by electricity generation enterprises. Under traditional regulatory models, due to information asymmetry, regulatory agencies may not be able to detect violations promptly. Meanwhile, electricity consumers may choose to accept violations by power generation companies due to high appeal costs. Blockchain technology enables regulatory agencies to improve their regulatory capabilities by eliminating information asymmetry, reducing the cost of complaints from electricity consumers, thereby elevating the risk for enterprises engaging in market violations and optimizing the evolutionary game towards an optimum state. © 2024 - IOS Press. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：11219 / 11233

页数：14

共 35 条

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