Application of Analytical Target Cascading in Iterative Bidding Mechanism of Complete Competitive Power Generation Market

被引：0
|
作者：
Xie M. [1 ]
Hu X. [2 ]
Liu M. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Electric Power, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou
[2] Guangzhou Power Supply Bureau of Guangdong Power Grid of China Southern Power Grid, Guangzhou
来源：
Dianli Xitong Zidonghua/Automation of Electric Power Systems | 2020年 / 44卷 / 06期
关键词：
Analytical target cascading; Economic dispatch; Iterative bidding; Power market;
D O I：
10.7500/AEPS20190304008
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Iterative bidding mechanism can promote power generators to quote electricity price economically and rationally and organize production. It can also give purchasers the ability to negotiate, and promote the coordinated and efficient operation of the power market. However, current iterative bidding methods mainly settle accounts according to the quoted price or the uniform marginal clearing price, but seldom according to the locational marginal price of nodes. There may be also too many iterations to be applied. Therefore, an iterative bidding model for power market based on analytical target cascading theory is proposed. Power generators and independent system operators are regarded as different stakeholders, and their objectives are optimizing the production efficiency and minimizing the cost of purchasing electricity, respectively. Coupling and parallel solution of the two optimized models are realized by connecting through generation power. Considering the influence of network constraints, the model can effectively motivate generators to report their real costs and is conducive to the optimal allocation of social resources. Examples of IEEE 39-bus system and IEEE 118-bus system show that analytical target cascading can be applied to the iterative bidding mechanism of fully competitive power generation market, and the convergence and computational efficiency can meet the requirements. © 2020 Automation of Electric Power Systems Press.
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页码：106 / 112
页数：6
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