Sustainable development of pharmaceutical industry: Balancing enterprise innovation with public interests

被引:0
作者
Xu C. [1 ]
Zhu D. [2 ]
机构
[1] Law School, Shanghai University, Shanghai
[2] School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai
关键词
Innovation incentive; Non-cooperative game; Pharmaceutical industry; Public interests;
D O I
10.18280/ijsdp.150506
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In the pharmaceutical industry, the conflicts mainly exist between innovator drug enterprise and generic drug enterprise, and between enterprises and patients. The first kind of conflicts are about technical innovation, and the latter kind are about public interests. Based on non-cooperative game model and theory, this paper analyzes the profit distribution between innovator drug enterprise and generic drug enterprise, highlighting the necessity of patent system in incentivizing the innovation of pharmaceutical enterprises and the problem of high drug prices induced by patent monopoly. Then, the excess profits tax (EPT) was introduced to regulate drug prices and safeguard the medical right of the patients. Further, the authors examined the decision-making motives of pharmaceutical enterprises in the game, and the effect mechanism of taxation. The results show that the patent system should protect both innovator drug enterprise and generic drug enterprise (as the secondary innovator); the system should be supported with taxation to regulate the market prices of drugs, such as to balance innovation with public interests and promote the sustainable development of technology and economy. © 2020 WITPress. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:639 / 645
页数:6
相关论文
共 22 条
[1]  
Wang C., Horby P.W., Hayden F.G., Gao G.F., A novel coronavirus outbreak of global health concern, The Lancet, 395, 10223, pp. 470-473, (2020)
[2]  
Von Graevenitz G., Wagner S., Harhoff D., Incidence and growth of patent thickets: The impact of technological opportunities and complexity, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 61, 3, pp. 521-563, (2013)
[3]  
Smith R.D., Correa C., Oh C., Trade, TRIPS, and pharmaceuticals, The Lancet, 373, 9664, pp. 684-691, (2009)
[4]  
Mahlich J.C., Roediger-Schluga T., The determinants of pharmaceutical R&D expenditures: evidence from Japan, Review of Industrial Organization, 28, 2, pp. 145-164, (2006)
[5]  
Liu C., Constantinides P.P., Li Y., Research and development in drug innovation: reflections from the 2013 bioeconomy conference in China, lessons learned and future perspectives, Acta Pharmaceutica Sinica B, 4, 2, pp. 112-119, (2014)
[6]  
Bao L., The competitive strategy for imitative innovation and generic drug, Science and China Youth Technology, 12, (2007)
[7]  
Saracho A.I., Patent licensing under strategic delegation, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 11, 2, pp. 225-251, (2002)
[8]  
Saracho A.I., The relationship between patent licensing and competitive behavior, The Manchester School, 73, 5, pp. 563-581, (2005)
[9]  
Sun Q., Santoro M.A., Meng Q., Liu C., Eggleston K., Pharmaceutical policy in China, Health Affairs, 27, 4, pp. 1042-1050, (2008)
[10]  
Zeng W., A price and use comparison of generic versus originator cardiovascular medicines: A hospital study in Chongqing, China, BMC health services research, 13, 1, (2013)