Modeling green supply chain games considering retailer's risk preference in fuzzy environment

被引：0
|
作者：
Wang S.-N. [1 ,2 ]
Hu Z.-H. [2 ]
机构：
[1] School of Business, Heze University, Heze
[2] Logistics Research Center, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai
来源：
Kongzhi yu Juece/Control and Decision | 2021年 / 36卷 / 03期
关键词：
Fuzzy environment; Green degree; Green supply chain; Innovation cost; Retailer's risk preference; Stackelberg game;
D O I：
10.13195/j.kzyjc.2019.0646
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
A two-echelon green supply chain model composed of a risk-neutral manufacturer acting as the leader and a retailer with different risk reference acting as followers is studied under a fuzzy decision environment. Considering the innovation cost, the parameters of demand function and manufacturing cost are all characterized as fuzzy variables. Then the optimum policy of the expected value and chance-constrained programming models are derived considering the different risk reference of the retailer. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the theoretical underpinning of proposed models, to compare the interaction among product greenness, wholesale price and retail price and different confidence levels, and to explore the influence of retailer's risk preference on the profit of manufacturers, retailers and green supply chains in the fuzzy green supply chain. Study results show that the confidence level of the profits for supply chain members affects the final optimal solutions. In the pessimistic decision-making model, with the increase of the confidence level, the level of product green degree, wholesale price and innovation cost gradually decline, but retail price and the overall profit of manufacturers, retailers and green supply chain gradually increase. The results is opposite in the optimistic decision model. Copyright ©2021 Control and Decision. All rights reserved.
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页码：711 / 723
页数：12
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