Multi-agent Game Model in Electricity Market Considering Power Quality

被引：0
作者：
Xiang Y. [1 ]
Yang J. [1 ]
Zang T. [2 ]
Liao K. [1 ]
He Z. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Electrical Engineering, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, 610031, Sichuan Province
[2] College of Electrical Engineering, Sichuan University, Chengdu, 610065, Sichuan Province
来源：
Dianwang Jishu/Power System Technology | 2020年 / 44卷 / 09期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Bi-level PSO algorithm; Bilateral transaction; Electricity market; Nash equilibrium; Power quality;
D O I：
10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2019.1956
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
With the promotion of the new electric power reform and the development of electricity market, power quality should be considered in power pricing. Meanwhile, pricing according to power quality is an important premise of establishing a fair trading environment of electric power market in the future. On this basis, a multi-agent game model of power market which takes power quality into account is proposed in this paper. Firstly, the power quality reward and punishment rules at the generator side and the power quality grading rules at the demand side are established. Secondly, based on the reward and punishment rules, a model for the generators is established to motivate the generators to produce high-quality power. Thirdly, based on the power quality grading rules, the cost function of the users who purchase power directly is described, and a double-layer decision-making model of the sellers are established. Finally, based on Nash equilibrium, a game model for multi-agents in electricity market considering power quality is proposed, and a bi-level particle swarm optimization algorithm based on Nash fitness function is used to solve this model. Numerical example results show that the game model of electricity market considering power quality proposed in this paper has a prominent incentive effect on urging the generators to produce high-quality power, and can help the sellers and the directly-purchase users balance their strategies in the bilateral contract market and the centralized trading market. Moreover, it can provide a valuable reference for the pricing according to power quality in the future. © 2020, Power System Technology Press. All right reserved.
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页码：3383 / 3393
页数：10
相关论文
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