A randomised scheme for secured modular exponentiation against power analysis attacks

被引：2

作者：

Barman M. ^{[1
]}

Mahanta H.J. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Assam Don Bosco University, Guwahati, Assam

来源：

Cyber-Physical Systems | 2019年 / 5卷 / 04期

关键词：

CMOS; DPA; modular exponentiation; power analysis attacks; RSA;

D O I：

10.1080/23335777.2019.1637944

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This paper presents an approach to compute secured modular exponentiation to mitigate power analysis attacks. Two processes have been designed based on ‘multiply-always’ binary method, which injects dummy multiplications so that the original multiplications can remain intact. The two processes are being invoked based on a random variable, which generated either 0 or 1. With these randomised modular exponentiation, the proposed approach can resist simple and differential power analysis attacks to a large extent. The proposed approach has been implemented using conventional ‘squaring-multiplication’ and ‘Montgomery-Ladder’ methods. Further, the work has also been extended to CRT-RSA, which is widely used for fast computation. The proposed method has been implemented for different key sizes of 1024-bit, 1536-bit and 2048-bit RSA & CRT-RSA. The analysis and results show that with a complexity of O(n), the proposed approach can resist some of the standard DPA attacks on modular exponentiation. © 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

引用

页码：209 / 230

页数：21

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