Defining Second-Order Desert

Philosophers who work on desert-adjustment within axiology often articulate the concept of desert as follows: x deserves y on the basis of z. This formulation allows for a focused examination that encompasses deservers, deservings, and desert bases. I call this firstorder desert. This paper posits that axiology grounded solely in firstorder desert fails to adequately capture our nuanced intuitions concerning desert. I contend that to construct an axiology that more effectively aligns with our desert-sensitive intuitions, we must incorporate considerations of second-order desert. Second-order desert is defined as follows: x deserves to live a life in which x deserves y on the basis of z. Initially, I provide a definition of first-order desert, followed by an elucidation of second-order desert. Subsequently, I explore various counter-arguments against my proposition. I defend my proposal against potential counter-arguments, demonstrating that a desert-adjusted axiological theory will be significantly betteroff by incorporating second-order desert considerations.