Algorithmic Collusion: Comparative Legal Analysis of Regulation in Russia and Abroad

被引:1
作者
Girich, M. [1 ]
Levashenko, A. [2 ]
机构
[1] Russian Foreign Trade Acad, Minist Econ Dev Russian Federat, 6A Vorobiyovskoye Highway, Moscow 119285, Russia
[2] Russian Acad Natl Econ & Publ Adm, OECD Ctr, 82 Prospekt Vernadskogo, Moscow 119571, Russia
来源
VESTNIK MEZHDUNARODNYKH ORGANIZATSII-INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS RESEARCH JOURNAL | 2024年 / 19卷 / 04期
关键词
collusion; tacit collusion; concerted actions; algorithms; competition;
D O I
10.17323/1996-7845-2024-03-08
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Today, companies use different pricing, monitoring, and demand and supply analysis algorithms, which, on one hand, increase profits and benefit consumers (for example, personalized discounts), but, on the other, can damage competition in cases of economic entities using algorithms to implement collusion or anti-competitive one-way behaviour or in cases of self-learning algorithms colluding with no human intervention. Much of the subject matter of this article stems from the adoption of special regulations on the use of algorithms in collusion over the past few years. The use of algorithms for the implementation of anti-competitive agreements in 2023 in Russia (amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation) is considered an aggravating circumstance. Foreign countries are developing similar regulation; for example, China has explicitly banned the use of algorithms not only in explicit collusion but also in tacit collusion (2021-23). - 23). The EU has recognized "collusion by code" as a cartel agreement (2023), and the US has proposed sed special rules to regulate implicit collusion using algorithms that analyze competitors' data (2024). Researchers have identified the types of harm that may result from the use of collusion algorithms by businesses. This article compares the approaches of countries to regulation of the use of algorithms, taking into account the three types of harm identified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and used by regulators of countries: whether algorithms are used as a tool to implement explicit collusion in existing agreements between economic entities; whether economic entities do not conclude agreements but nonetheless come to concerted action using similar software that is based on algorithms that generate the same price or market determinations for all competitors; and whether self-learning algorithms conspire autonomously (without human intervention) and without the knowledge of economic agents. Comparative legal analysis will help identify how countries approach the problem of collusive use of algorithms, which has become possible in a digital economy. Methods of research used in this article include comparative analysis of legal acts and law enforcement practices in Russia and abroad.
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页数:22
相关论文
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