Unconscious Perception, Action, and the Problem of Attribution

According to Phillips, (1) genuine perception is attributable to the individual (i.e. it is a personal state/event, as opposed to sub-personal states/events in the individual's brain); (2) since unconscious perceptual representations are ill-suited to guide action, there is no good reason to attribute them to the individual; (3) not being attributable to the individual, they do not instantiate genuine perception, thereby failing to support the hypothesis that genuine perception can occur unconsciously. I argue that this reasoning is flawed and cannot be easily fixed. Phillips contends that unconscious perceptual representations do not guide action because they fail to meet certain conditions that are sufficient for action guidance. But those conditions may not be necessary for action guidance. Consequently, unconscious perceptual representations may guide action even if they do not meet Phillips' conditions. Furthermore, due to his commitment to the distinction between personal and sub-personal states/events, Phillips is not in a position to argue that his conditions are necessary for action guidance. For the distinction applies to action as well as to perception, and when genuine action is identified by personal-level criteria, Phillips' conditions turn out unnecessary for action guidance.