(De)centralized governance and the value of platform-based new ventures: The moderating role of teams and transparency

被引:4
作者
Martino, Pierluigi [1 ]
Vanacker, Tom [2 ,3 ]
Filatotchev, Igor [4 ,5 ]
Bellavitis, Cristiano [6 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pisa, Dept Econ & Management, Via Cosimo Ridolfi 10, I-56124 Pisa, Italy
[2] Univ Ghent, Fac Econ & Business Adm, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium
[3] Univ Exeter, Business Sch, Rennes Dr, Exeter EX4 4PU, England
[4] Kings Coll London, London, England
[5] WU Vienna, Vienna Univ Econ & Business, Vienna, Austria
[6] Syracuse Univ, Whitman Sch Management, Syracuse, NY USA
关键词
Entrepreneurial finance; Platform governance; Decentralization; Platform performance; Initial Coin Offerings; Demand-side theory; G10; G23; G30; L26; M13; FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING INFORMATION; CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INNOVATION; IMPACT; FIRM; INFRASTRUCTURES; ORGANIZATION; ARCHITECTURE; DISCLOSURE;
D O I
10.1007/s11187-024-00964-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Drawing on institutional and demand-side perspectives, we investigate performance implications of (de)centralized governance modes in platform-based new ventures, and the conditions under which (de)centralization generates more value. Using a sample of 1,431 Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), a new source of entrepreneurial finance, we find that centralization of decision-making is positively associated with platforms' market value. Further, we consider how platform characteristics affect this relationship, finding that both the presence of an experienced Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and project transparency negatively moderate the positive relationship between centralization and market value. Thus, decentralized platforms need leaders with technical experience and project transparency to generate more value. Overall, this study provides a better understanding of the boundary conditions that increase the value of (de)centralized governance. This study investigates how different governance structures impact the market value of new blockchain-based ventures that conduct Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). We explore the roles of centralized and decentralized decision-making and how these structures affect platform performance. Our findings show that centralized governance, where decision-making is concentrated, tends to increase a platform's market value. However, having an experienced Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and clear project transparency can reduce the reliance on centralization. This implies that decentralized platforms can also achieve high market value if they have transparent processes and skilled leaders who can manage the technical aspects. The primary implication for practice is that new blockchain platforms should focus on hiring experienced technical leaders and ensuring transparency in their projects to attract investors and customers.
引用
收藏
页码:1763 / 1790
页数:28
相关论文
共 134 条
[1]   Why do businesses go crypto? An empirical analysis of initial coin offerings [J].
Adhami, Saman ;
Giudici, Giancarlo ;
Martinazzi, Stefano .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS, 2018, 100 :64-75
[2]   THE CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER [J].
ADLER, PS ;
FERDOWS, K .
CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 1990, 32 (03) :55-62
[3]   An organizational approach to comparative corporate governance: Costs, contingencies, and complementarities [J].
Aguilera, Ruth V. ;
Filatotchev, Igor ;
Gospel, Howard ;
Jackson, Gregory .
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 2008, 19 (03) :475-492
[4]   Understanding the human side of openness: the fit between open innovation modes and CEO characteristics [J].
Ahn, Joon Mo ;
Minshall, Tim ;
Mortara, Letizia .
R & D MANAGEMENT, 2017, 47 (05) :727-740
[5]   Initial Coin Offerings: a Hybrid Empirical Review [J].
Alshater, Muneer M. ;
Joshipura, Mayank ;
El Khoury, Rim ;
Nasrallah, Nohade .
SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS, 2023, 61 (03) :891-908
[6]   PLATFORMS, OPEN/USER INNOVATION, AND ECOSYSTEMS: A STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP PERSPECTIVE [J].
Altman, Elizabeth J. ;
Tushman, Michael L. .
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND PLATFORMS, 2017, 37 :177-207
[7]   The architecture of participation: Does code architecture mitigate free riding in the open source development model? [J].
Baldwin, Carliss Y. ;
Clark, Kim B. .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2006, 52 (07) :1116-1127
[8]   CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVESTORS' PERCEPTIONS OF FOREIGN IPO VALUE: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE [J].
Bell, R. Greg ;
Filatotchev, Igor ;
Aguilera, Ruth V. .
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 2014, 57 (01) :301-320
[9]  
Bellavitis C., 2021, Journal of Business Venturing Insights, V15, pe00213, DOI [10.1016/j.jbvi.2020.e00213, DOI 10.1016/J.JBVI.2020.E00213]
[10]   Do old theories fit new contexts? New perspectives on corporate governance in entrepreneurial firms [J].
Bellavitis, Cristiano ;
Deloof, Marc ;
Filatotchev, Igor ;
Hermes, Niels ;
Paeleman, Ine .
VENTURE CAPITAL, 2023, 25 (02) :117-133