Unintended effects of tax-sharing adjustments on firms' pollution emissions: Evidence from China

被引:1
作者
Shen, Yanyan [1 ]
Guo, Feng [2 ]
Li, Zhen [3 ]
机构
[1] Hefei Univ Technol, Sch Econ, Hefei 230009, Anhui, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Econ & Adm, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[3] Nanjing Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Finance & Taxat, Nanjing 210023, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
关键词
Intergovernmental tax-sharing revenue; Corporate tax collection reform; Local environmental enforcement; Pollution emissions; China; LOCAL PUBLIC-GOODS; WATER-POLLUTION; ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE; ECONOMIC-PERFORMANCE; PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH; FISCAL INCENTIVES; PORTER HYPOTHESIS; ENFORCEMENT; FEDERALISM; AIR;
D O I
10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107888
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The impact of tax-sharing adjustments on firms' pollution emissions is theoretically unclear. Exploiting a quasinatural experiment generated by the corporate tax collection reform in China, this study discerns a causal relationship between tax-sharing adjustments and firms' pollution emissions. Our findings reveal that a reduction in the local retention rate of tax-sharing revenue is associated with a significant decline in firms' pollution emissions. The mechanisms elucidate that, when the local retention rate of tax-sharing revenue decreases, local governments tend to strengthen environmental enforcement through the collection of pollution fees, inspection of violations, and imposition of environmental penalties. Notably, the pollution-reducing effects are more pronounced in the eastern regions, where corporate income tax losses are highest, or in the two control zones with a higher cost of incomplete environmental enforcement. Conversely, these effects are less pronounced for real estate firms, which can provide revenues to compensate for local corporate income tax losses. Our results suggest that partially reducing the tax nexus between local governments and local firms can to some extent contribute to improvements in environmental quality.
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页数:13
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