Research on the Green Transition Path of Airport Development under the Mechanism of Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

被引:0
|
作者
Lv, Yangyang [1 ]
Wan, Lili [1 ]
Zhang, Naizhong [1 ]
Wang, Zhan [1 ]
Tian, Yong [1 ]
Ye, Wenjing [2 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Univ Aeronaut & Astronaut, Coll Civil Aviat, Nanjing 210016, Peoples R China
[2] Zhejiang Sci Res Inst Transport, Hangzhou 311305, Peoples R China
关键词
green airport development; transition path; tripartite evolutionary game; stage division; reward and punishment mechanisms;
D O I
10.3390/su16188074
中图分类号
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要
Since existing studies primarily explore green development measures from the static perspective of a single airport stakeholder, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic choices of three key stakeholders: airport authorities, third-party organizations, and government departments, based on evolutionary game theory. By solving the stable strategy of the tripartite evolution using the Jacobian matrix, the green transition of airport development can be divided into three stages: "initiation", "development", and "maturity", allowing for the exploration of key factors influencing the green transition of airport development. A simulation analysis is conducted based on real Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport data. The results indicate that the tripartite evolutionary game strategy is stable at E4(0,0,1) and the green transition of Baiyun Airport remains in the development stage. By improving the reward and punishment mechanisms of government departments, the evolutionary game strategy can be stabilized at E8(1,1,1), promoting the green transition of airport development toward the mature stage. By adjusting the game parameters, the dynamic process of green transition in airports at different levels of development and under varying regulatory environments can be effectively captured, supporting the precise formulation of corresponding policies.
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页数:26
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