Research on the Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Behavior of Joint Operation between Coal Power Enterprises and New Energy Power Enterprises under Government Supervision

Based on the perspective of joint operation between coal power enterprises and new energy power enterprises (JOCN), this paper constructs an evolutionary game model among coal power enterprises (CPEs), new energy power enterprises (NEPEs) and the government, and analyzes the influencing factors of the final strategy choices of various subjects through evolutionary simulation. The results show that: (1) The game among CPEs, NEPEs and the government in JOCN is a win-win game. (2) The probability of CPEs choosing to participate in the joint operation is positively correlated with additional operating income, government subsidies and environmental costs in coal power generation, while negatively correlated with additional operating costs and spillover effects. (3) The probability of NEPEs choosing to participate in the joint operation is positively correlated with additional operating income, government subsidies and the cost of power loss in new energy power generation, while negatively correlated with additional operating costs and spillover effects. (4) The probability of the government choosing to support joint operation is positively correlated with social welfare, and negatively correlated with the cost of governmental strict supervision. The research results can provide theoretical reference for enterprises and the government in the future transformations and policy formulation.