Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship

被引：0

作者：

Ewens, Michael ^{[1
]}

Nanda, Ramana ^{[2
]}

Stanton, Christopher ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Columbia Business Sch, Henry Kravis Hall,732,665 W 130th St, New York, NY 10027 USA

[2] Imperial Coll London, London, England

[3] Harvard Sch Business, Boston, MA USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2024年 / 79卷 / 05期

关键词：

EXPERIMENTATION;

D O I：

10.1111/jofi.13383

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We show theoretically that a critical determinant of the attractiveness of venture capital (VC)-backed entrepreneurship for high-earning potential founders is the expected time to develop a startup's initial product. This is because founder-CEOs' cash compensation increases substantially after product development, alleviating the nondiversifiable risk that founders face at startup birth. Consistent with the model's predictions of where the supply of entrepreneurial talent is likely to be most constrained, we find that technological shocks differentially altering the expected time to product across industries can explain changes in both the rate of entry and characteristics of individuals selecting into VC-backed entrepreneurship.

引用

页码：3361 / 3405

页数：46