Water dynamics and environmental social practice in a differential game

被引：2

作者：

Biancardi, Marta ^{[1
]}

Iannucci, Gianluca ^{[2
]}

Villani, Giovanni ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bari, Dept Econ & Finance, Bari, Italy

[2] Univ Florence, Dept Econ & Management, Florence, Italy

来源：

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PLANNING SCIENCES | 2024年 / 92卷

关键词：

Environmental corporate social responsibility; Groundwater management; Open loop equilibrium; Differential game; Asymmetric duopoly; GROUNDWATER-MANAGEMENT; RESPONSIBLE FIRMS; COMPETITION; EXPLOITATION; STRATEGIES; EXTRACTION; RESOURCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.seps.2024.101819

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates how socially and environmentally responsible practice influences the dynamics of a common aquifer and its impact on social welfare. We analyze a differential game between two firms, profit seeking (PS) and environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR), that pump water to sell it to farmers. The profit of the PS firm is composed of revenues, extraction and taxation cost. Conversely, the ECSR maximizes an objective function composed of profit, consumer surplus, and environmental damage. From the analysis of the model, it emerges that only a balance of the social and the environmental concern can preserve the water table and improve the social welfare.

引用

页数：6