KK is Wrong Because We Say So

被引:1
作者
Goldstein, Simon [1 ]
Hawthorne, John [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Southern Calif, Los Angeles, CA USA
关键词
ASSERTION;
D O I
10.1093/mind/fzae050
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
This paper offers a new argument against the KK thesis, which says that if you know p, then you know that you know p. We argue that KK is inconsistent with the fact that anyone denies the KK thesis: imagine that Dudley says he knows p but that he does not have 100 iterations of knowledge about p. If KK were true, Dudley would know that he has 100 iterations of knowledge about p, and so he wouldn't deny that he did. We consider several epicycles, and also explore whether the argument type also challenges other structural conditions on knowledge, such as closure under deduction.
引用
收藏
页码:33 / 59
页数:27
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