Do Disciplinary Sanctions Affect Political Parties' Re-election? Evidence from Colombia

被引:0
作者
Posada, Hector M. [1 ]
Valencia, Enrique Javier Burbano [2 ]
Mondragon-Mayo, Angie [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Antioquia, Dept Econ, Medellin, Colombia
[2] Univ Santiago Cali, Cali, Colombia
[3] Univ Rosario, Econ, Bogota, Colombia
关键词
Elections; conflict; fraud; sanctions; political parties; D72; D73; D74; H7; H11; Elecciones; conflicto; fraude; sanciones; partidos pol & iacute; ticos; VOTER TURNOUT; CORRUPT POLITICIANS; INFORMATION; SUPPORT; AUDITS;
D O I
10.1177/1866802X241235676
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Our study examines whether citizens punish political misbehavior by estimating the impact of disciplinary sanctions on the re-election of political parties in Colombian mayoral elections. Results reveal that disciplinary sanctions have no effect on the re-election of paramilitary-linked parties. However, they can have a significant negative impact on the re-election of traditional and minority parties. The lack of punishment suggests that organizations manipulate voters through persuasion mechanisms, aligned with the Schumpeterian view of political competition. Nuestro estudio examina si los ciudadanos castigan la mala conducta pol & iacute;tica estimando el impacto de las sanciones disciplinarias en la reelecci & oacute;n de los partidos pol & iacute;ticos en las elecciones a alcaldes de Colombia. Los resultados muestran que las sanciones disciplinarias no tienen ning & uacute;n efecto sobre la reelecci & oacute;n de los partidos vinculados a los paramilitares. Sin embargo, pueden tener un impacto negativo significativo en la reelecci & oacute;n de los partidos tradicionales y minoritarios. La falta de castigo sugiere que las organizaciones manipulan a los votantes a trav & eacute;s de mecanismos de persuasi & oacute;n, alineados con la visi & oacute;n schumpeteriana de la competencia pol & iacute;tica.
引用
收藏
页码:200 / 223
页数:24
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