AI-driven corporate governance: a regulatory perspective

被引:0
作者
Bello y Villarino, Jose-Miguel [1 ,2 ]
Bronitt, Simon [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sydney, Sch Law, New Law Bldg F10, Camperdown, Australia
[2] RMIT Univ, ARC Ctr Excellence Automated Decis Making & Soc, Bldg 97,106-108 Victoria St, Carlton, Vic, Australia
基金
澳大利亚研究理事会;
关键词
AI; corporate governance; regulation; automated compliance management systems;
D O I
10.1080/10383441.2024.2405752
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
The use of AI-driven or AI-assisted systems in corporate compliance is a novel topic in the business and management literature, only marginally considered by legal academia. While some scholarly pieces have explored the use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems to support compliance in the financial sector (eg, for anti-money laundering purposes), the legal implications of deploying AI systems to fulfil corporate compliance tasks has not yet received the attention it deserves. This article approaches the use of AI in corporate compliance and governance through the eyes of a regulator. Its aim is to present how the use of AI compliance systems within corporations can be leveraged by the entities tasked with ensuring the good governance of firms. Concretely, it explores a not-too-distant future, where some of the regulation of corporations can be driven by a mandate to systematically deploy Automated Compliance Management Systems (ACMS) within corporations as a way to enforce and monitor good governance. The article suggests that several of the limitations that regulators are currently facing to ensure the prevention of fraud, corruption or other forms of corporate non-compliance, could be addressed if regulators offered firms the possibility of being continuously monitored by an automated AI-driven system which systematically tracks the corporation's data footprint. We then explore what is required for such a regulatory approach to be feasible and effective. In our view, regulators must first establish the standards of reliability for those systems (ie, the legal meaning of 'red flags' issued by the system of potential violations) and, second, actively supervise how companies react to the outputs of those systems (ie, what companies do when a red flag is raised by the system). In the final part of the article, we offer a more concrete example to the reader. We suggest it could be possible to test such an approach in Australia through regulatory sandboxes for the mining sector, concretely, to monitor compliance with antibribery obligations overseas.
引用
收藏
页码:355 / 374
页数:20
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