Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information

被引：1

作者：

Arieli, Itai ^{[1
]}

Arigapudi, Srinivas ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Data & Decis Sci, IL-3200003 Haifa, Israel

[2] Indian Inst Technol Kanpur, Dept Econ Sci, Kanpur, India

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2024年 / 147卷

基金：

以色列科学基金会;

关键词：

INNOVATION DIFFUSION; STATISTICAL-INFERENCE; CONVERGENCE; EQUILIBRIUM; EVOLUTION; DYNAMICS; SPEED;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.009

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates the dynamics of product adoption under incomplete information regarding the product quality. A new agent observes a small sample of product choices within the population and receives a noisy private signal regarding the realized state of the world. Using simple heuristics, the agent estimates both the product quality and the distribution of product choices in the population. The agent then chooses a product that is a best response to this estimate. We show that fast adoption of the optimal product in the population occurs if and only if the strength of the private signal exceeds a certain threshold.

引用

页码：377 / 387

页数：11