D&O Insurance and Firms' Environmental Information Disclosure: Evidence from China

被引:1
作者
Zhao, Yuliang [1 ]
Yang, Xiandong [2 ]
机构
[1] Inner Mongolia Univ, Sch Econ & Management, 235 Univ West Rd, Hohhot 010021, Inner Mongolia, Peoples R China
[2] Ludong Univ, Sch Business, Yantai, Peoples R China
关键词
D&O insurance; environmental information disclosure; corporate governance; corporate social responsibility; OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; DIRECTORS; RISK; COVERAGE;
D O I
10.1080/1540496X.2024.2391321
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study analyzes the impact of directors' and officers' liability (D&O) insurance on firms' environmental information disclosure quality. Our findings demonstrate that D&O insurance improves environmental information disclosure quality, which aligns with the governance hypothesis. We ensured the reliability of our results by controlling for endogeneity; our results remained consistent across alternative measures and specifications. This effect is particularly pronounced in state-owned enterprises and firms without prior environmental penalties, financial restatements, or audits conducted by the top 10 accounting firms. This study provides important practical implications, suggesting that purchasing D&O insurance significantly enhances enterprises' level of environmental governance.
引用
收藏
页码:476 / 492
页数:17
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