Local Fiscal Health in Russia: An Achilles' Heel of Fiscal Federalism?

被引:0
|
作者
Yushkov, Andrey [1 ,2 ]
Alexeev, Michael [3 ]
Dedyukhin, Ivan [3 ]
机构
[1] Indiana Univ Bloomington, ONeill Sch Publ & Environm Affairs, 1315 E 10th St, Bloomington, IN 47401 USA
[2] Leontief Ctr, Res Dept, St Petersburg, Russia
[3] Indiana Univ Bloomington, Dept Econ, Bloomington, IN USA
关键词
Fiscal health; local governments; fiscal federalism; Russia; SELF-GOVERNMENT; FINANCE REFORM; INCENTIVES; DECENTRALIZATION; SYSTEM;
D O I
10.1080/01900692.2024.2399133
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
This article is the first attempt to systematically study local public finance in contemporary Russia. We document that local governments do not have sufficient own-source revenues, are increasingly more dependent on intergovernmental fiscal aid, lack access to market borrowing, and suffer from structural flaws in the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Additionally, we present the results of the modified Brown's 10-point test to compare local fiscal health across the Russian regions. Finally, we assess the strength of local fiscal incentives in 2012-2021 and demonstrate that local governments in Russia lack capacity to foster local economic growth through the tax code.
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页数:15
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