Belief in truthmaker semantics

被引：1
作者：
Jago, Mark [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Nottingham, Dept Philosophy, Univ Pk, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
来源：
SYNTHESE | 2024年 / 204卷 / 04期
关键词：
Truthmaker semantics; Epistemic logic; Belief; Logical omniscience; Hyperintensionality; Kit fine; Stephen Yablo; LOGIC;
D O I：
10.1007/s11229-024-04748-z
中图分类号：
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要：
Stephen Yablo has argued that ascriptions of belief and knowledge are sensitive to subject matter and that theorising in such terms may help resolve philosophical questions about the semantics of such ascriptions. Truthmaker semantics offers a way of theorising about subject matters. My main aim in this paper is to investigate what a semantics for knowledge or belief ascriptions might look like within truthmaker semantics. I then discuss what the resulting account might have to say about the problem of logical omniscience, the nature of concepts, and rational belief.
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页数：24
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