Practical Knowledge and the Structural Challenge

Elizabeth Anscombe characterised practical knowledge as knowledge 'in intention'. As Anscombe recognised, accepting this view involves rejecting certain basic orthodox epistemological assumptions. But even once this is done, a challenge remains for a conception of practical knowledge as knowledge 'in intention'. For while practical knowledge would appear to be a kind of propositional knowledge, intentions would appear to be a kind of non-propositional attitude. I call this the 'Structural Challenge' for an intention-based account of practical knowledge. After rejecting two suggested responses - one which views intentions as propositional attitudes; one which views practical knowledge as non-propositional knowledge - I offer my own solution by showing how simply having and carrying out an intention to phi will ordinarily meet a plausible neutral condition on propositional knowledge. Knowing a fact will in general involve being mentally related to it via a successful exercise of relevant concepts. The account I develop turns on viewing a person's carrying out an intention to phi as their constituting the fact that they are phi-ing, through a practical exercise of their concept of phi-ing. The resulting account sheds light both on the analogies, and on the crucial formal differences, between practical and theoretical knowledge.