Mass Political Information on Social Media: Facebook Ads, Electorate Saturation, and Electoral Accountability in Mexico

被引:2
作者
Enriquez, Jose Ramon [1 ]
Larreguy, Horacio [2 ]
Marshall, John [3 ]
Simpser, Alberto [2 ]
机构
[1] Stanford Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[2] ITAM, Mexico City, Mexico
[3] Columbia Univ, New York, NY USA
关键词
EFFECTIVE NUMBER; COMMUNICATION; EQUILIBRIUM; MALFEASANCE; NETWORKS; PARTIES; MODEL;
D O I
10.1093/jeea/jvae011
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Social media's capacity to quickly and inexpensively reach large audiences almost simultaneously has the potential to promote electoral accountability. Beyond increasing direct exposure to information, high saturation campaigns-which target substantial fractions of an electorate-may induce or amplify information diffusion, persuasion, or coordination between voters. Randomizing saturation across municipalities, we evaluate the electoral impact of non-partisan Facebook ads informing millions of Mexican citizens of municipal expenditure irregularities in 2018. The vote shares of incumbent parties that engaged in zero/negligible irregularities increased by 6-7 percentage points in directly-targeted electoral precincts. This direct effect, but also the indirect effect in untargeted precincts within treated municipalities, were significantly greater where ads targeted 80%-rather than 20%-of the municipal electorate. The amplifying effects of high saturation campaigns are driven by citizens within more socially-connected municipalities, rather than responses by politicians or media outlets. These findings demonstrate how mass media can ignite social interactions to promote political accountability.
引用
收藏
页码:1678 / 1722
页数:45
相关论文
共 76 条
  • [1] When Does Information Influence Voters? The Joint Importance of Salience and Coordination
    Adida, Claire
    Gottlieb, Jessica
    Kramon, Eric
    McClendon, Gwyneth
    [J]. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 2020, 53 (06) : 851 - 891
  • [2] Network Structure and the Aggregation of Information: Theory and Evidence from Indonesia
    Alatas, Vivi
    Banerjee, Abhijit
    Chandrasekhar, Arun G.
    Hanna, Rema
    Olken, Benjamin A.
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2016, 106 (07) : 1663 - 1704
  • [3] The Welfare Effects of Social Media
    Allcott, Hunt
    Braghieri, Luca
    Eichmeyer, Sarah
    Gentzkow, Matthew
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2020, 110 (03) : 629 - 676
  • [4] Diffusing Political Concerns: How Unemployment Information Passed between Social Ties Influences Danish Voters
    Alt, James E.
    Jensen, Amalie
    Larreguy, Horacio
    Lassen, David D.
    Marshall, John
    [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 2022, 84 (01) : 383 - 404
  • [5] [Anonymous], 2010, Chicago Studies in American Politics
  • [6] Priors Rule: When Do Malfeasance Revelations Help Or Hurt Incumbent Parties?
    Arias, Eric
    Larreguy, Horacio
    Marshall, John
    Querubin, Pablo
    [J]. JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2022, 20 (04) : 1433 - 1477
  • [7] Information Provision, Voter Coordination, and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Mexican Social Networks
    Arias, Eric
    Balan, Pablo
    Larreguy, Horacio
    Marshall, John
    Querubin, Pablo
    [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 2019, 113 (02) : 475 - 498
  • [8] Auditoria Superior de la Federacion, 2014, INF RES FISC SUP CUE
  • [9] Optimal Design of Experiments in the Presence of Interference
    Baird, Sarah
    Bohren, J. Aislinn
    McIntosh, Craig
    Ozler, Berk
    [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 2018, 100 (05) : 844 - 860
  • [10] Banerjee Abhijit V., 2011, DO INFORM VOTERS MAK